Polish President Karol Nawrocki, the nationalist successor to Andrzej Duda elected in summer 2025, has appointed a council to rewrite the Polish constitution — a move that has dramatically escalated his ongoing confrontation with Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s centrist coalition government and which is being closely watched in Brussels and across European capitals as a test case for the European Union’s ability to manage internal democratic backsliding within member states.
Who is on the council
The council appointed on Sunday includes a roster of figures clearly aligned with Poland’s national-conservative political tradition. Among the announced members are former Constitutional Tribunal judges, retired generals, conservative legal academics from Catholic universities, and several figures associated with the previous Law and Justice (PiS) government. Notably absent are members of the legal establishment associated with the Tusk coalition’s reform program.
The council’s stated remit is to produce, within 18 months, a draft constitutional revision that “reflects the Polish nation’s historical, cultural, and Christian identity.” The vague mandate provides scope for substantial changes to the existing 1997 constitution, particularly around the relationship between national and EU law, the structure of the judiciary, and the protection of family and religious rights.
The procedural reality
Constitutional changes in Poland require either a two-thirds majority in the Sejm (the lower chamber of parliament) or a national referendum followed by parliamentary ratification. Nawrocki’s coalition does not possess a two-thirds majority — the Tusk-led centrist coalition controls the Sejm. The council’s work, therefore, cannot directly produce a new constitution.
What it can do is generate political pressure and provide ideological framing for future referendum campaigns. Nawrocki’s strategy, as understood by Polish political analysts, is to maintain constitutional revision as a live political issue, mobilising the conservative electorate ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections. If PiS or its successor formation regains a Sejm majority in those elections, the council’s drafts would become the foundation for actual constitutional change.
The EU dimension
For Brussels, Nawrocki’s announcement is uncomfortable on multiple levels. The European Commission spent the first three years of the Tusk government working with Warsaw to restore the rule of law following the PiS-era judicial reforms that had triggered Article 7 proceedings against Poland and substantial fines. The Tusk government’s reforms — restoring judicial independence, reversing media law changes, rebalancing the constitutional court — have been welcomed by Brussels.
Nawrocki’s council represents a counter-attack: an attempt to embed conservative constitutional thinking at the foundational level, beyond the reach of ordinary legislation. The Commission has not yet issued a formal response, but European officials privately characterise the announcement as “a return to the worst patterns of 2015-2023.”
The Tusk response
Prime Minister Tusk’s response has been measured but firm. In a statement issued through the Chancellery on Sunday evening, Tusk described the council as “a private initiative of the President without legal standing” and reiterated that “the Polish constitution can only be changed through proper democratic procedures.” The implicit message — that the council’s work is, at best, an exercise in political theatre — may prove difficult to maintain if the council produces influential draft texts.
The deeper challenge for Tusk is that constitutional debate is divisive territory for his centrist coalition. The Civic Platform party (Tusk’s vehicle), the Polish People’s Party, and the Left coalition all have different views on the most contested issues — abortion rights, judicial structure, EU primacy — and a sustained constitutional debate would expose those internal divisions.
The European context
Nawrocki’s move comes amid a broader pattern of nationalist governance experimentation across Europe. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has long pursued a similar constitutional strategy. Italy’s Giorgia Meloni has implemented more limited but ideologically aligned reforms. France’s Marine Le Pen — should she win the 2027 presidential election — has signalled interest in similar moves. The Polish case is being watched as a test of whether nationalist constitutional politics can be sustained in a country with a deeply pro-European population (consistently 70%+ supportive of EU membership) and a centrist government.
For UK observers, the parallels with the Brexit debate are not exact but instructive. Both involve fundamental constitutional questions being driven by political mobilisation rather than dispassionate legal analysis. Both involve tension between national sovereignty narratives and supranational legal frameworks. The Polish case, however, is unfolding inside the EU rather than at its edge.
What happens next
The council is expected to begin work within weeks, with a stated 18-month timeline to produce draft texts. The European Commission will likely issue a formal response within days, likely emphasising procedural concerns and offering to engage with the Tusk government on rule-of-law cooperation. The Polish constitutional court — which the Tusk government has been working to restore as an independent institution — will face its own difficult question about whether to issue any opinions on the council’s status.
The most consequential moment will come in autumn 2026, when the council is expected to publish its first interim report. The content of that report — particularly its recommendations on EU-Poland legal relations — will determine whether the Polish constitutional debate remains a contained domestic political issue or escalates into a broader European crisis.
The British perspective
For the UK, Polish constitutional politics matters for two reasons. First, Poland is one of the largest UK trading partners in Central Europe, with British exports of approximately £8 billion in 2025. Constitutional instability in Warsaw translates into trade and investment uncertainty. Second, Poland is the largest single source of EU citizens living in the UK, and political upheaval in Poland can produce migration consequences that affect British communities and labour markets.
UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy issued a routine statement supporting “Poland’s continued democratic development and rule of law commitments” — diplomatic language that signals attention without taking a side in what is, ultimately, a domestic Polish political battle. Whitehall observers note that the UK’s post-Brexit position on EU internal disputes is structurally limited; the UK can comment but cannot meaningfully shape outcomes inside the Union.
For British investors and businesses with Polish exposure, the practical advice from major City firms is to monitor developments through Q3 and Q4 2026, with particular attention to the council’s interim outputs and any escalation of EU-Poland legal proceedings.
— Thomas Hargreaves, London Capital Post
